Solidity is a widely used scripting language for developing smart contracts in blockchain applications. Quality assurance of Solidity contracts is of critical importance because bugs can lead to a considerable loss of assets. As software testing is a common practice for quality assurance, many Solidity projects have included built-in tests. It is unclear, however, what level of quality assurance these built-in tests can achieve. This paper presents Deviant, a mutation testing tool for Solidity smart contracts. It automatically generates mutants of a given Solidity project and runs all mutants against the given tests to evaluate their effectiveness. To simulate various faults in Solidity smart contracts, Deviant provides mutation operators for all the unique features of Solidity according to the Solidity fault model, in addition to the traditional programming constructs. We have used Deviant to evaluate the effectiveness of the tests for three Solidity projects. The results indicate that these tests have not yet achieved high mutation scores and that a test suite adequate for the statement and branch coverage criteria of Solidity smart contracts does not necessarily provide a high-level assurance of code quality. Such observations offer important guidelines for Solidity developers to implement more effective tests in order to deliver trustworthy code and reduce the risk of financial loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has led to one of the biggest economic anomalies in recent years. As a popular platform for blockchain applications, Ethereum provides a Turing-complete instruction set [1] , allowing for the development of more computationally expressive smart contracts in blockchain applications. Among the several high-level programming languages that can compile into Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode, this paper focuses on Solidity. Different from traditional programs, a Solidity smart contract cannot be simply patched after it has been compiled and added to the blockchain because of the nature of Ethereum and blockchain. Quality assurance of smart contracts is therefore extremely important in the development process. For instance, a vulnerability in the DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) resulted in the loss of approximately $50 million worth of ether (Ethereum's cryptocurrency) [2] .
As for traditional software development, software testing is one of the common techniques for quality assurance of Solidity smart contracts. It exercises a Solidity program with test cases, aiming to find faults or vulnerabilities. Most of the existing open source Solidity projects have included built-in tests.
Nevertheless, it is unclear what level of code quality can be assured by these tests or how effective the tests can be. One way to assess the effectiveness is to evaluate how many faults can be revealed. In reality, however, real-world projects seldom keep track of every fault that has occurred during their development processes. To address this issue, a widely-applied approach is mutation testing, which aims to simulate programming faults by creating mutants of a given program [3] . Each mutant has one fault injected by a mutation operator. A mutant is said to be killed if it fails one or more test. A live mutant not killed by any test can be either faulty or equivalent to the original program. Mutation score, i.e., the mutant-killing ratio between the number of mutants killed and the total number of non-equivalent mutants, is often used to indicate the fault detection capability of given tests. Mutation testing has been applied to various programming languages. Experiments have shown that mutants are indeed similar to real faults for the purpose of evaluating testing techniques [4] .
In this paper, we present Deviant, a mutation testing tool for Solidity smart contracts. It aims to automatically generate mutants of a given Solidity project that simulate various faults that may occur during the programming process, and automatically run the tests of the given Solidity project against each mutant so as to evaluate the testing effectiveness. Thus, Deviant can help Solidity developers deliver higher quality code and reduce the risk of financial loss. This research is the first attempt to apply mutation testing to Solidity smart contracts. The contributions are twofold:
• In addition to the mutation of traditional programming constructs (e.g., expression and inheritance), Deviant covers all the features that are unique to Solidity smart contracts. This allows for the evaluation of tests that target Solidity-specific features.
• Deviant has been applied to three Solidity programs to evaluate the effectiveness of their tests. The results indicate that these tests have not achieved high mutation scores. Even a test suite that is adequate for the statement and branch coverage criteria of Solidity smart contracts does not necessarily provide a highlevel assurance of code quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces background. Section III describes the design of Deviant. Section IV presents the experiments. Section V reviews related work. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Ethereum and Solidity
Ethereum is a platform that uses blockchain technology. Ethereum operates with accounts. An Ethereum account contains a nonce, which is a counter to make sure that transactions can only happen once. It also contains the balance for that specific account, where the currency that Ethereum uses is known as Ether. An account may also optionally contain contract code, meaning that if a contract is written then that account will have the appropriate contract code associated with their account. Another part of an Ethereum account is its storage. There are two types of accounts, externally owned accounts controlled by private keys, and contract codes controlled by contract code. This contract code is produced by a language's compiler, such as Solidity. Applications built in Solidity are called dApps (Decentralized applications). Instead of being run on a central server or node, dApps are distributed across a blockchain contained on several nodes. Everyone that is participating has a copy of the blockchain and no one can gain an advantage over each other.
B. Mutation Testing
Mutation testing is the process of modifying small portions of code and then running the modified code (called mutant) against tests [3] . Tests will either fail or pass while running the mutant version. If all tests pass the mutant version of the code, then the mutant is marked live, otherwise the mutant is marked as killed. These markings are used to calculate the mutation score. High mutation scores indicate high quality tests. Mutation testing can evaluate the effectiveness of a given test suite and can be used to generate tests. Mutation operators explain what changes will happen to the source code when a certain attribute in the source code is found. These operators are comprised of the relevant syntax and its possible changes. For instance, a mutation operator may replace '>' with '<'.
Mutants are similar to real programming mistakes. It is possible that a valid mutant is functionally equivalent to the original code. These mutants are called equivalent and do not offer any insight into the adequacy of a test suite. These are an expensive problem in mutation testing because they will still be tested while not offering anything of value. There is also the problem of generating mutants based off of the operators which are syntactically incorrect, leading the program to not compile. This is an overhead because the incorrect mutants will still have to compile and fail the process, however, these mutants should not count when determining the mutation score.
III. THE DESIGN OF DEVIANT
A. Overview
Deviant aims to automatically generate mutants of a given Solidity project and run the given tests against each mutant to evaluate the testing effectiveness. Figure 1 shows the architecture of Deviant. Given a Solidity project together with test code, Deviant selects one program file (contract, library, and/or interface) at a time, parses it into an abstract syntax tree (AST), and applies (user-selected) mutation operators to respective nodes of the AST to generate mutants. Mutation operators are defined according to a comprehensive fault model of the Solidity language. In addition to the normal fault types in traditional languages (e.g., expression in JavaScript and inheritance in Java), our fault model considers Solidityspecific features as well as the existing Solidity fault taxonomy [5] . Each mutation operator generates one or more mutants by making one change to the given AST. Each mutant is saved into a new file that contains the change. After all the mutants have been generated, a single mutant will be copied into the Solidity project directory and compiled into EVM bytecode as if it were the original project. The tests of the given Solidity project will be run against the EVM bytecode. This process is repeated until every mutant has been run against the tests. Deviant keeps track of the test execution result of each mutant (e.g., pass or fail) and produces a summary report on the mutation testing (e.g., mutation score, killed mutant count, and live mutant count).
A main technical issue about mutant generation is how to ensure that each mutant is a valid program before compilation. A mutant is only considered valid if it is a contract that can be compiled. The syntax is straightforward as Solidity was designed to be similar to JavaScript. However, the implication of a syntactical change on the semantic is often not as straightforward.
B. Fault Model of Solidity Smart Contracts
In Deviant, each mutation operator is designed to create mutants that simulate a certain type of faults in Solidity smart contracts. The collection of fault types implied by all mutation operators is referred to as the fault model. The goal of Deviant is to make the fault model as comprehensive as possible so that the generated mutants will simulate as many types of faults as possible. It is worth pointing out that the current mutation operators in Deviant create mutants by making only one change to the original program (called first-order mutation operators). While such small changes may only represent minor faults directly, the mutation testing research has shown that real bugs are often composed of such minor faults [4] .
In the following, we describe the fault model from the perspective of Solidity program structures. Generally, a Solidity program consists of version information and three kinds of optional modules (contract, library, and interface), as shown in the given code snippet. Contract and interface are similar to class and interface in object-oriented programming (OOP) languages, respectively. A contract may inherit one or more parent contracts or interfaces. It consists of state variable declarations, functions, and function modifiers. While state variables and functions are comparable to instance variables and methods in OOP, they have Solidity-specific features. In the given code snippet, stateAddress is an internal state variable whose type is address. foo is a payable external function with a modifier called funcModifier. A function or function modifier is composed of a sequence of statements which may use various expressions as in OOP methods.
The constructs in a Solidity file fall into four levels:
• Inter-module: this level involves signatures of modules and relationships among them.
• Intra-module: this level involves the immediate constructs within a module.
• Intra-function and function modifier: this level involves individual statements within a function.
• Intra-statement: this level involves components (e.g., expression) within a statement.
For each level, we identify feasible faults with respect to the programming constructs. For example, an incorrect use of inheritance is an inter-module fault (e.g., "is IA" is removed from "contract A is IA"). Missing the reference and defitinion of a function modifier in a contract is an intra-contract fault (e.g., funcModifier is removed from the signature of foo and the definition of funcModifier is removed). Missing a statement within a function of a contract is an intra-function-level fault (e.g., msg.sender.send (10) is removed from the function foo), whereas an incorrect expression within a statement is an intrastatement level fault (e.g., 10 is changed to 1 in msg.sender.send (10) . The above classification ensures that the fault model covers the fault types of every programming construct in Solidity.
C. Mutation Operators
This paper focuses on the operators for Solidity-specific features or features not supported by other mutation tools.
Intra-statement level
Intra-statement level mutant operators are those that modify the components within a statement. Typically, they modify different types of expressions.
Gas Operators: The only mutation operators that take place on gas involve the modification of the literal value. Deviant modifies the literal value to either a zero or random non-zero value. The notion of gas introduced in Ethereum assures that a Turing-complete smart contract will eventually stop. General Turing-complete programs suffer from the well-known halting problem. If the contract's gas value is modified, then it may cause the execution to stop either prematurely or continue on too long. The gas mutation operators are Modify Function Gas Value to Non-Zero (FGVNZ) and Modify Function Gas Value to Zero (FGVZ).
Address Operators: Address operators mutate attributes of an address variable. Addresses in Solidity can be represented as any numerical value. However, they are typically represented in a hexadecimal format. The modify address operators Modify Address Literal to Non-Zero (MALNZ) and Modify Address Literal to Zero (MALZ) modify any instance of an address literal (e.g. address variable being assigned to an address literal). The Switch Call Expression Casting (SCEC) mutation operator modifies instances of addresses being casted to contracts. Specifically, SCEC finds instances of two or more different address variables being casted to different contracts, keeps track of the contract names, and then modifies the contract name that is associated with the address being cast. Consiser the following code:
The address variable address1 is being cast to Contract1, meaning that the developer is assuming that the actual Contract1 code resides at that address. However, when the mutation is applied, the address1 is instead cast to Contract2 as follows:
Contract2 contract1 = Contract2(address1) //Mutation Contract2 contract2 = Contract2(address2)
In this case, the code makes the assumption that the Contract2 code resides at address1, which is not the case if the developer was correct.
Address Function Operators:
There are several functions that are associated with addresses including: transfer, send, and call. In any of these instances, they should contain a literal or some variable as parameters in its argument. If the function contains a literal as an argument, Deviant can modify this value to create a mutant. However, a potentially more dangerous fault that could exist in a smart contract is using the incorrect address function. For instance, the transfer function throws an error on failure, while also having a gas stipend of 2,300. On the other hand, send simply returns false on failure, while also having a gas stipend of 2,300. Send is different than transfer because send will not revert when it fails, while transfer will. Call is potentially the most dangerous out of all the function calls because it is not considered safe against reentrancy attacks, such as the DAO attack that was explained earlier. By swapping these function calls, there is a potential to create a vulnerable contract. If a test suite does not account for this type of error, then the test suite might be considered weak. Table 1 shows the list of address function operators. 
Data Location Operators:
The data location mutation operators swap the memory location keyword in the source code. The purpose of these mutation operators is that the difference between storage and memory actually affects the behavior of the variables. For instance, storage variables persist beyond the lifespan of a function call, whereas the life span of a variable with the memory keyword is temporary, only existing in the function that it is declared in. Also, by design storage is quite a bit more expensive to use than memory, but this allows for storage variables to be more dynamic. This means that data types such as arrays are automatically assigned to the storage location to allow for dynamic usage. It is also important to note that memory variables cannot exist outside of the lifespan of a function, meaning that global variables cannot be declared as memory variables. The Data Location Operators are change Storage to Memory (STRME) and change Memory to Storage (MESTR).
Intra-function level
Function level mutation deals with the mutation of the contents within a function. These contents include function calls, statements, or blocks, which may be comprised of multiple function calls or statements.
Event Operators: Events can fire from the smart contracts and anything connected to the Ethereum JSON-RPC API can listen to the events and then act. In the context of Solidity, events are primarily used for the EVM logging facilities. When an event is called the arguments are stored in the transaction log, which resides in the blockchain. In dApps, when events are fired, the JavaScript can be notified and can then act accordingly. Of course, by applying these mutation operators, the decentralized application will potentially act improperly because an event was fired when it should not have. The event operators are Remove Event Invocation (REI) and Swap Event Invocations (SEI).
Selfdestruct Operators: Selfdestruct statements are essential for creating gas efficient contracts. Calls such as selfdestruct (suicide is an alias to selfdestruct) send the entirety of a contract's balance to an address that is supplied as an argument and subsequently clears all of its data from the blockchain. This function call is primarily used when the contract is no longer needed. The selfdestruct call is more gas efficient than using this.call() or send() to to achieve the same thing.
Exception-Handling Operators:
Exception-handling is a serious problem that exists in the EVM. Exception disorder is a fault for Solidity because the EVM does not handle all errors the same. Because of the nature of error-handling in Solidity, Exception-handling operators provide a lot of insight into a test suite's ability to handle exceptions. A good example of the exception ambiguity exists in the difference between the send and transfer calls for sending ether to a contract. As explained earlier, send only returns false on the failure, while transfer throws an exception on failure. In some instances, a programmer might include a require statement on a send function call, this is actually equivalent to the a transfer function call. In terms of mutation, if this require statement is removed, then an error will not be thrown and cannot be caught by the contract that has that code. This is a subtle error, but if the exception-handling is not done properly, then the code may still execute because it does not catch the exception that has occurred.
Change Function Modifier Condition (CFMC):
The function modifiers in Solidity are used to execute code before a function is called. Primarily, these functions are used to check a precondition before the actual function is ran. The CFMC operator modifies the condition that exists inside the modifier code itself. In this case, it is modified to always fail its precondition check and not return to the flow of the function.
Intra-module level
State Variable Visibility Operators: These mutation operators modify the visibility of state variables in a contract. Public state variables can be accessed through the immediate contract or through external contracts. Internal variables can only be accessed by the immediate contract or through child contracts. Private variables are similar to internal variables with the exception that they cannot be accessed through child contracts. Visibility operators exist in many programming languages, but are unique in semantic meaning in Solidity.
Function Type Operators:
There are three primary function types in Solidity: payable, pure, and view. Payable functions are functions that can receive ether. On the other hand, pure and view functions are functions that have constraints on accessing the state of a program. Pure functions cannot read or modify the state of a program (e.g. modifying or reading state variables). View functions cannot modify the state, but can still read the state.
Function Visibility Operators:
There are four types of function visibility in Solidity: public, private, internal, and external. These mutation operators swap the different function visibility keywords around. They are useful because of the major differences that exist between the different types of visibility. For instance, external functions can only be called by other contracts and transactions, while internal functions can be called by the function it is declared in and all contracts that are derived from it. Now, while public and private might seem semantically similar to external and internal functions, they are not. Public functions allow for anyone to access, this is different from external, where only outside transactions and functions can call it. On the other hand, private functions can only be called from the contract that it is declared in, meaning that no derived contracts can access this function.
Modifier Signature Operators: They can significantly change the behavior of a contract due to changed behavior of the required preconditions for a function, meaning that the function may or may not execute.
• Delete Function Modifier (DFM): It deletes any modifier argument associated with a function signature. This should cause the precondition check to be ignored when the contract is running.
• Insert Modifier on Function (IMF): In the case that there is no modifier argument attached to a function signature, while a modifier still exists in a contract, a mutation can occur where a modifier argument is attached to a function.
Library Function Visibility Operators:
Libraries serve a different purpose than contracts in that they are deployed once to a specific address and then their code is reused by contracts that use the libraries. Again, libraries contain functions with visibility modifiers, however, they function slightly different than normal contracts. For instance, the internal keyword causes the function to be inlined into the calling contract's bytecode. The reason that this exists is that for some smaller libraries, it is more efficient to compile the function inline rather than to link the bytecode.
Inter-module level
The only inter-contract level operator deals with multiple-Inheritance. Unlike Java, Solidity supports multipleinheritance. There are complicated problems with multipleinheritance. One is the diamond problem [6] , where classes B and C inherit from A and then D inherits from B and C. The reason that this is a problem is because of the same function in A is overridden in B and C, then which version of the function will D use? In the case of Solidity, this problem is solved by using C3 linearization [8] , which is also the method that Python uses for solving its diamond inheritance problem. Now, if a parent was removed from the diamond inheritance structure, it could potentially affect the chosen overridden function, causing the contract to use overridden function from the remaining parent. Remove One Parent (ROP) operator removes a parent from its inheritance structure, which should cause the contract to use the overridden function that is provided by the remaining parent.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
A. Implementation
Deviant is implemented by using several tools from the Solidity development community. Truffle is the tool set for compiling and executing the test suites of Solidity programs (the solc compiler 0.4.24 and Truffle 5.0.8). The mutation operators are coded in NodeJS 8.10.0 using npm 4.6.1 as the package manager. Solparse is used for parsing the Solidity smart contracts and Solmeister for traversing the AST and generating the Solidity source code.
B. Experiments
Our experiments used three subject programs ( Table 2 ).
• MetaCoin (https://github.com/truffle-box/metacoinbox.): MetaCoin is part of a popular collection called Truffle Box. MetaCoin is one of the boilerplates. The purpose of MetaCoin is to provide a simple boilerplate for the creation of a coin in a smart contract.
• Alice (https://github.com/alice-si/contracts): Alice is a social impact platform build on top of Ethereum. The unique aspect of Alice is that these social projects are run transparently. The goal of this project is to allow organizations to identify and scale projects according to their performance.
• aragonOS (https://github.com/aragon/aragonOS): aragonOS is a framework that can be used to develop dApps, protocols, and decentralized organizations. Specifically, aragonOS adds a layer of abstraction for managing resources when creating decentralized organizations and protocols.
Each subject program has much more test code than the production code. The tests for MetaCoin have achieved 100% and 50% of statement coverage and branch coverage of the production, respectively. The tests for Alice have not reached full statement coverage mostly because of exception handling code, which is not exercised unless the exceptions are triggers.
The tests of aragonOS have almost satisfied the complete statement and branch coverage criteria. The experiments are performed on regular workstation and laptop. For each subject program, we first generate the mutants of the program, run the tests against all mutants, remove live equivalent mutants, and report mutation scores. In the experiments, both contracts in MetaCoin are mutated with all operators. Of the 22 contracts in Alice, 19 are meaningful and applicable. They are mutated by all operators. Due to the complexity of aragonOS and time-consuming of the mutation testing, currently we have applied mutation testing to 15 of the 43 contracts in aragonOS, focusing on the mutation operators for Solidity-specific features. Table 3 shows the experimental results. The mutation scores of Solidity-specific features of all subject programs are very low (36.36%-37.82%). This indicates that the existing tests are unable to reveal the majority of faults Solidityspecific programming constructs although they have covered almost all statements (or even all branches in aragonOS). As such, we believe that a test suite adequate for the statement and branch coverage of Solidity programs does not necessarily provide a high-level assurance of code quality. In our experiment, there were several Solidity-specific mutation operators that were regularly missed by tests. The most common live Solidity-specific mutants dealt with the visibility of functions and state variables. In most cases, these mutants were live when the visibility keywords were semantically similar. For example, the subtle difference between the private and internal keyword is that a child contract can inherit the parent contract's construct if that construct is marked as internal. We believe that developers will often times not directly address this subtle semantic difference in their test suite, but rather make assumptions about not needing to check for this condition. Also, another interesting trend was that many modifier mutants were also not killed. Typically, it would make sense for preconditions to be checked by tests. However, we believe that developers are either considering only the happy-path scenario or the state that causes the modifier to fail is hard to achieve. In a similar vein, exception-handling mutants also have a considerable number of live mutants. We believe the reasoning to be the same as the live modifier mutants, considering that it is often hard to directly address exceptions in a test suite. Mutants that deal with literal values such as gas and address mutants were typically killed by all the provided tests. This makes sense considering that these values are often times easy to check for in a test suite or the errors that they cause propagate quickly throughout a program. Selfdestruct mutants were killed most of the time, but still were live in several instances throughout our experiment. This was surprising to us considering the effects of calling selfdestruct. However, one potential explanation is that the contract is never called again after the selfdestruct call has executed. Event mutants in most cases were killed, but in some situations were still live. Considering that events are typically used for EVM logging facilities and the JavaScript portion of the dApp it makes sense that sometimes events may be overlooked in a test suite.
V. RELATED WORK
Atzei et al. [5] conducted a survey on the security on Ethereum, particularly the vulnerabilities that exist in Solidity. Atzei provides a taxonomy for the vulnerabilities that exist in Solidity, breaking them down into three levels: Solidity, EVM, and Blockchain. Mavridou et al. [9] proposed a Finite State Machine (FSM) approach to generating Ethereum smart contracts. Their framework, named FsolidM, is deigned to bridge the gap between the programmer's understanding of the Ethereum semantics versus what the actual semantics are. Another paper by Grishchenko et al. [10] presented the first complete small-step semantics of EVM byte-code. The proof assistant F* is used to formalize small-step semantics. Liu et al. [11] proposed a fuzzing approach to automatically detect reentrancy bugs in smart contracts. Deviant shares similar mutation ideas with two existing mutation testing platforms, muJava [11] and Stryker [12] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a mutation testing tool for Solidity smart contracts. It provides a comprehensive set of mutation operators for simulating various types of faults that are unique in Solidity. Our experiments have demonstrated that the tool is applicable to the evaluation of testing effectiveness of realworld Solidity smart contracts. This is very useful for developers to deliver high-quality Solidity applications.
Currently we are applying Deviant to more real-world Solidity projects. Our future work will conduct an in-depth analysis of why the majority of non-equivalent mutants are not killed even though the tests have satisfied the statement or branch coverage criteria. This is expected to provide insightful guidelines for developing more effective tests for Solidity smart contracts. We also plan to explore the feasibility of automatically generating tests from the mutants.
